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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the disruption in world oil markets which was
triggered by the 1978-79 Iranian revolution. The resultant price rises
are explored in the context of the behavior of the spot market and key
OPEC countries. In particular, the economic and political roles of excess
oil supply in the Persian Gulf nations are discussed. Conclusions for the
likely future are presented, along with the implications for United States
policy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Events in Iran have produced a period of severe disruption in oil
markets. Almost a year after the Iranian revolution there is still
considerable confusion and uncertainty, and very likely we face several
more months of painful adjustment before the market settles down again.
This is hardly an ideal time to try to take stock of what has happened,
because it is all too easy to be misled by short-term phenomena and the
emotions of the moment, and to miss the developments that will weigh
heavily in the longer run. These events are significant for the world
economy, however, and many decisions are being called for in response
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2to them. The tea leaves need to be read, even while they are swirling in
the cup.
There is one consolation: we are unlikely to see anything new. The
history of international commodity cartels is a long one, and we have a
growing if painful experience with OPEC. Moreover, there is little in
recent events that cannot be explained by one well-known theory or
another--whether geologic, economic, or political. The problem in the
current oil situation is to decide what weight to give to competing
theories and explanations, several of which are consistent with the
observable data.
We will argue that the disruption of oil producton in Iran simply
brought to the fore a circumstance that most observers knew was possible,
but thought unlikely. That is, a temporary loss of supply from any major
exporter could tighten markets and lead to an upward ratcheting of the oil
price. The price setters might welcome such an opportunity. But even if
they did not, it might be difficult for them to control the sequence of
events once under way. Given the speed with which spot prices can move in
such a circumstance, and the rapidity with which surcharges on contract
volumes can follow increases in spot prices, the avoidance of such an
upward price ratchet may require a coordinated and vigorous balancing
response by Saudi Arabia and others in OPEC. If these nations are unable,
or unwilling, to play such a role during short-term situations, then
temporary supply disruptions can easily produce uncontrolled, and largely
unpredictable, price movements. Today, the probability of such events is
seen to be higher than in the past, and correctly so.
2. THE CRUNCH, THE SQUEEZE, AND THE RATCHET
In the past two or three years, there has been a lively debate about
future developments in the world oil market. Most studies have been
long-term in focus. Some have been based upon static programming
solutions for future years, or on some form of annual simulation of supply
and demand. Still others based forecasts on optimizing models of OPEC
behavior. Most of these analyses have devoted little time to the possible
consequences of a major supply disruption. Such events have not been
ignored completely, but very little has been done to foresee behavior in
the face of a supply disruption, or to analyze ways in which the oil
market might be different if disruptions were common. In keeping with a
long-term focus, most analyses have treated excess capacity as readily
available in the short term, and have dealt with the aggregate excess
capacity in OPEC as a whole and its evolution over periods of a decade or
more.
Our attention has now been diverted to short-term phenomena. To
begin an analysis of what we have learned, it is useful to review what
these previous analyses had to say before the Iranian interruption. Most
of these studies fall into one of three camps: those believing in the
"crunch," the "squeeze," or the "ratchet."
2.1 The Crunch
The most common approach to the problems of the oil market has been
to forecast an oil "crunch." World oil prices are assumed to hold roughly
constant in real terms in the future, and independent supply and demand
projections are made at this price. Sooner or later, the demand on OPEC
4rises to equal and then to surpass available capacity in OPEC. Some
studies compute gaps of unmet oil demand (e.g., Workshop on Alternative
Energy Strategies, 1977). Others forecast a price jump at approximately
the point at which the excess capacity in the cartel dries up (e.g., U.S.
CIA, 1977).1 More recent studies discuss price and income adjustments
needed to close the predicted gap (e.g., U.S. DOE, 1978 and U.S. CIA,
1979).
There are various views of the ways in which the cartel nations might
be led into such a circumstance. On the one hand, it is argued that these
countries would like to raise the oil price before the "crunch," but are
restrained by political pressures or fears about the impact of significant
increases in the real oil price on the world economy. Others argue that
the key Persian Gulf producers do not need the money, and they are tired
of spending their national patrimony to support the energy appetites of
the developed countries; thus they will simply stop capacity expansion at
some arbitrary point and wait for nature to take its course.
A variant of the "gap" or "crunch" model is one which argues that
anticipatory actions by consumers and non-OPEC suppliers will cause prices
to rise well ahead of any expected shortfall in supply. In this model the
cartel cannot hold prices constant up to some calculated point where
demand rises to equal capacity, even if its members want to. These
studies see prices rising rapidly over a period of two to four years in
advance of the point at which demand approaches physical capacity limits.
All these models share the view that the cartel will actually try to
follow a policy of constant real prices over time, until the point when
For a critique of this view, see Adelman and Jacoby (1978).
___
5market forces take over. This view assumes that key supplier nations will
do little to manipulate price directly, with the exception of maintaining
the real value of a barrel of their exported oil at the level of the
mid-1970's.
62.2 The Squeeze
Others model the behavior of the cartel in line with theories of
monopoly behavior and the economics of exhaustible resources; the result
is a computation of the wealth-maximizing price path over the next few
decades (Cremer and Weitzman, 1976; Pindyck, 1976; and ICF Inc., 1979).
These studies show the real price of oil rising gradually over time, with
the precise trajectory dependent upon the underlying structure of the
demand and supply equations, upon estimates of demand and supply
elasticities and overall reserves of oil to be found, and upon the assumed
form of bargaining between consumers and producers. Implicit in these
studies is a gradual squeeze of the world oil market, as prices rise in
real terms year-to-year under cartel control.
Usually such analyses are advertised as indicating only rough trends
in price; the actual trajectory is likely to be characterized by bumps and
jerks around the long-run trend as the cartel feels its way. The authors
of these studies face considerable uncertainty about the best way to
structure the problem and to choose parameter values, and most would agree
that the cartel managers are no better informed. Nevertheless, such
studies imply that the cartel actually exercises control over price. The
process of price adjustment is assumed to be similar to that utilized by
OPEC nations in December 1978, when they announced a scheduled series of
price increases to take place during the period from December 1978 through
the end of 1979.
72.3 The Ratchet
Finally, there is a view that the cartel wants to adjust price
gradually over time, as the "squeeze" analysis would imply, but its
members are restrained politically from following such a policy. If the
world-wide inflation rate is assumed to be 5 to 10 percent per year and
if, as many of the "squeeze" models imply, an optimal real oil price rises
at 2 to 5 percent per year during the 1980's, then the cartel must raise
the nominal oil price approximately 7 to 15 percent each year over a long
period of time. It is argued that this continuing rise is not feasible in
the face of strong pressures from consumer governments and that some other
mechanism will have to be used to move the price up.
One way to achieve this increment in price would be for the cartel
leaders to establish policy limits on production, which might be
significantly below installed capacity. They could then hold to these
supply ceilings as oil demand grew to the level of supply committed to the
market. Under such conditions, pressures in the spot market would
eventually take over: spot prices for crude oil and refined products
would rise, and short-term surcharges on crude oil contracts would
follow. Once the roof had been lifted, so to speak, it would be possible
for the cartel to establish a higher floor through an increase of the OPEC
marker crude price. Countries of the cartel core could then encroach upon
that capacity held in reserve, to increase aggregate supply and bring the
surcharges back in line with the new official OPEC level.2
20f course, without substantial excess capacity in reserve, this
strategy could prove extremely risky. The time to expand capacity may be
several years. Setting out to prepare a ratchet, the cartel could create
the "crunch" described above.
8Were significant price increases to be gained by this method, the
path would not be the smooth one derived from analytical models of the
market, but would take a series of jumps followed by periods of
adjustment. The process would be difficult to control; cartel leaders
could easily overshoot; and periods of price erosion might follow
intermittant increases of, say, 20 to 40 percent.
Both the "squeeze" and the "ratchet" explanations of cartel behavior
assume that the cartel controls the oil market. Both models also
implicitly assume that the cartel leaders will exercise their ability to
absorb shocks by use of the excess capacity they hold and will maintain a
price close to the preferred trajectory, clouded though their view of this
optimal path may be. Of course, their capability to do this depends both
upon the actual installation of enough excess capacity to perform the
shock-absorber role, and upon the willingness and ability of these leaders
to exercise short-term flexibility in the event things threaten to get out
of hand.
93. THE PRICE INCREASE OF 1979
3.1 What Happened?
Let us then turn to the events of the last year and see how they fit
within the framework of pre-Iran analyses. Table 1 and Figure 1 tell the
story. As can be seen in Table 1, oil output in October 1978 was up
significantly from the third quarter of that year, due in part to normal
demand growth. Some stock building by consumers was probably under way in
anticipation of the OPEC price hike announced for December, and
undoubtedly some speculation was involved as well. Iranian production
began to drop significantly in November, and as Iran left the market other
suppliers filled in. In previous months, a fair amount of excess capacity
had been on the fringes of the market, ready to be sold at all times, but
most exporters had not been willing to shave prices far enough to open a
place for their oil.
From September to December 1978, production also went up
substantially in Saudi Arabia and in other countries of the Persian Gulf.
Thus, even though Iranian production was down by 3.5 million barrels per
day by December 1978, world output was still above the average level of
the third quarter. Of course, in the absence of a good short-term model
of oil consumption, the relationship of output to demand can only be
guessed. Over periods as short as two to three months stock movements are
also very important. There is some information on the size of primary
stocks (those held by major producers and refiners); but there are almost
no data on the quantities of oil in secondary stocks (oil at sea, oil held
by major jobbers and distributors, and oil held by industries), and what
may be called tertiary stocks (gasoline in cars and oil in homes, etc.).
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As Iran began to falter, certain oil companies were caught short and
had to go into the spot market for crude oils and products. Since this
is a very narrow market as measured against the size of the Iranian loss,
the effect of this demand on spot prices was dramatic. Over the period
October through December 1978, spot prices for oil products rose strongly
in European markets, as did the spot prices for crude oils. By December
Saudi Light was selling on spot at several dollars above the marker price
(Figure 1).
In January 1979 there were two additional shocks to the oil market.
Iranian exports stopped completely, and Saudi Arabia announced that it
was going to cut back production to an average of 9.5 million barrels per
day for the first quarter of 1979. For a period in December 1978, Saudi
Arabian production had gone as high as 10.5 million barrels per day, and
this production level was continued into the early weeks of January. In
order to meet the announced target of 9.5 for the month, it was necessary
to cut back to around 8 million barrels per day, which Saudi Arabia
apparently did for a time in January. The precise week-to-week
production is not widely known.
What was important about the Saudi cutback however, was its effect
on expectations. It was not known how long the Iranian conflict would
last, and the Saudi cutback added to the pressure on spot markets. Spot
prices for crude oils jumped precipitously, as shown in Figure 1.
Subsequent events followed as naturally as night follows day. In January
1979, Saudi Arabia announced a $1.20 premium on all oil in excess of the
previously announced policy limit of 8.5 million barrels per day.
Shortly thereafter, other countries began to add surcharges to their
crude oils. OPEC oil ministers argued for this premium by criticizing
13
the "profiteering" and "ugly exploitation" of oil companies that were
collecting the rents available under the rising market prices for crude
oil. By late February 1979, most producers were selling crude oils at
prices far above the then official marker price of $13.34, but all were
below the spot market prices, which were still rising. Then, in the OPEC
meeting of March 26, 1979, the official price was raised to $14.55--in
effect, bringing forward the price step that was due in late 1979. This
left most countries with surcharges above the new official OPEC price,
with only Saudi Arabia selling at the official level.
During the second quarter of 1979, this circumstance persisted, with
most suppliers levying surcharges of $3 to $4 per barrel in addition to
the official $14.55 price. Then in late June, the next step was taken.
The price of Saudi Light was moved to $18 per barrel; but this price
remains as a floor, with most exporters intending to hold to some premium
above the $18 level. Oils.with a transport or quality advantage over the
marker crude traditionally collect a premium of up to $1.50 to $3.00, but
as of Fall 1979 premiums as high as $6.00 are in effect. Saudi Arabia,
and perhaps her immediate neighbors, may increase output and bring spot
prices and contract premiums back in line with this new $18 price. Or,
they may refuse to increase output, which will keep markets tight and
hold contract premiums significantly above the official price. Such
action would then set the stage for further marker price increases later
in the year.
No one yet knows what will happen, even assuming Iranian output
remains stable at 3 to 4 million barrels per day. If a significant loss
of production were to recur in Iran, or in any other oil-producing
nation, then under these tight market conditions a new round of price
increases would undoubtedly be initiated.
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3.2 Interpretation of the Events
So what was this latest disruption in the oil market? Was it the
beginning of the "crunch?" Are we in the middle of a fateful and
potentially devastating confrontation between growing demand and
permanently limited supply? Is it simply a controlled "ratchet" by
certain OPEC nations as they take advantage of the Iranian situation to
raise prices sooner than they might otherwise have been able to do? Is
there some other model of market structure and behavior that now appears
closer to the facts than those laid out above? The answers to these
questions have strong policy implications, for actions taken on the basis
of one interpretation can prove very costly if other explanations turn
out to be closer to the truth.
The Crunch? The scenario of an oil "crunch" refers to the
circumstance in which demand presses against available capacity and the
oil producers can do nothing to help, even if they want to. This has not
been the case in recent months, and it need not be so in the near future
unless another major source of supply fails.
There is much debate about the production capacity in OPEC, but a
look at two of the best-known sources gives us a feel for the situation.
Table 2 shows OPEC productive capacity and the excess month by month.
This particular estimate is a summary of industry opinion, by and large.
Excess capacity outside Iran is around 4 million barrels per day
throughout the period October 1978 through July 1979, with 2 to 3
million barrels attributable to Saudi Arabia and her immediate
neighbors. A more conservative estimate, by the CIA, is shown in Table
3. These estimates of "maximum sustainable" capacity yield excess
capacity totals of 1.5 to 2 million barrels per day over the same
period: the excess capacity is again concentrated on the Arabian
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Note that several nations produced more than the CIA estimate of
"maximum sustainable" capacity. In fact, over the short run of a few
months, the CIA's estimate of "installed" capacity may be the more
relevant.3 This estimate resembles very closely the PIW numbers in
Table 2, except that Saudi Arabia is credited by the CIA with 12,840
million barrels per day instead of the 10,840 shown in the PIW estimate.
Whichever estimate comes closer to the correct figure, however, it
appears that sufficient capacity existed to replace Iranian oil without
serious disruption to world markets. Since Iranian production is back up
to over 3 million barrels per day, any tightness in the market today is
not caused by a physical "crunch" but by production controls by OPEC
leaders.
Moreover, OPEC can avoid falling into a "crunch" circumstance
through the manipulation of demand by price, and by additional capacity
creation. Table 4 shows two sample calculations using an oil capacity
forecasting model prepared by the M.I.T. World Oil Project (Adelman and
Paddock, 1979; and Adelman and Jacoby, 1979). The first column shows
what would have happened to field productive capacity had each of these
countries sustained a 5 percent growth rate in development drilling over
the period 1975 to 1978. Excluding Iran, capacity could have been raised
4.5 million barrels per day over the PIW estimate or approximately 3
million above the CIA estimate of "installed" capacity. In fact, many of
these countries did not sustain this investment rate. Table 4 also shows
3In the CIA definition, "Installed capacity, also called nameplate
or design capacity, includes all aspects of crude oil production,
processing, transportation, and storage. Installed capacity is generally
the highest capacity estimate." CIA International Energy Statistical
Review, May 2, 1979.
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Table 4
POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF OPEC PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY
(Thousand barrels per day)
1978 Potential as Possible net additions
seen from 1975 a from 1979 to 1982b
Saudi Arabia 14,700 3,000
Kuwait 3,200 (200)
UAE and Qatar 3,500 400
Iraq 3,675 700
Libya 2,750 250
Venezuela 2,750 (450)
Nigeria 2,450 (100)
Indonesia 1,900 150
Algeria 1,300 300
Other 500 0
Subtotal 36,725 4,050
Iran 7,200 0
Total OPEC 43,926 4,050
NOTES:
a. Assumes a 5 percent annual increase in development drilling.
b. Assumes a 5 percent annual increase in development drilling, and
production at capacity.
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what could be accomplished by 1982 if this 5 percent annual increase in
capacity development investment were carried out beginning in 1979. If
such growth were to occur, an additional 4 million barrels per day (of
field capacity) could be added over the 1979-82 period.
Of course, such investments require planning time; these increases
cannot be had by 1982 if the decision is made only in 1980. These
figures do give an indication, however, of the growth potential of the
key OPEC countries, should they decide that capacity expansion is in
their interest. The data indicate that an oil "crunch" need not occur
because of the technical inability of OPEC producers to expand
production. It is rather the policy decisions of these
nations--influenced as they are by a host of economic, social, and
political factors--that determine the outcome.
The Ratchet: Economics or Politics? Recent events may clearly be
interpreted as an example of the "ratchet" method of price
administration. OPEC had already established a programmed plan of price
increase to take place over the calendar year 1979. It can be argued
that the oil price was still below the wealth-maximizing levels, and OPEC
nations would have taken advantage of any opportunity to move closer to
the optimum path. Thus, in this view, once the dimensions of the Iranian
crisis became clear, Saudi Arabia cut back production to 9.5 million
barrels per day to provide more force for a ratchet of the crude oil
price. It may be assumed that this action was based on as careful a
calculation as possible of its implications for price movements. Saudi
Arabia thus moved production to a little above 9.5 million barrels per
day during the period, January through March 1979, and then cut back to
8.5 million in April, May, and June. Once again, the move to 8.5 may be
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interpreted as meaning that Saudi Arabian officials intended to keep the
premiums high, in oraer to take the marker price higher when OPEC met
again in June. In July, Saudi Arabia went back up to 9.8 million,
presumably to try to cool things down as spot prices were rising again in
the early part of the summer.
Others argue that the production cutback in January was purely a
political decision. Saudi Arabia had previously announced a policy of
limiting production to 8.5 million barrels per day, and we should take
seriously the possibility that the additional 1 million barrels per day,
to 9.5 million, was all they could do within the limitations of their
internal political system and the pressures of the general political
circumstance in the Middle East. Moreover, one may believe that some set
of political changes exists that will satisfy Arab political objectives
and lead to a relaxation on the oil price front in the near term. Or,
barring an easing of prices, we may look forward to the creation of more
supply capability and an increased likelihood that it will be used to
moderate ratchets in the future. In this view, if the desired political
gains are not achieved, we should expect continuing production
cutbacks--to the point that all nations are disadvantaged economically,
including the Arab producing states.
At this stage we cannot tell which of these views is more nearly
correct, for all moves made thus far, however political the trappings,
appear to be to the economic advantage of the oil exporters. Very likely
the true story of producer behavior, were it known, would comprise some
complex blend of factors, with the weights of different factors shifting
over time and the strategy not necessarily clear even to the inside
players.
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Also, producer behavior has not yet been tested in the face of
extreme events, though we are surely close to such a test. Had the price
of oil gone significantly higher over recent months, as it might have if
Iran had stayea out for a longer period, then the threat to the world
economy might have been significant. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other
oil-producing states might well have come back up to full production
capacity to try to avoid crisis. These nations may do so yet, if the
spiral of prices continues or if an additional jump is stimulated by
production cutbacks elsewere in the system. Of course, it is difficult
to estimate precisely how much excess capacity is needed to control large
price swings. If a major supply source is shut down for more than a
month or two, the sustainable excess capacity elsewhere in the system
must at least equal the amount dropped, else a price increase is
certain. Consumer expectations and risks of additional shut-downs would
call for still more excess. All that can be said at this point is that
the capacity existed to cover Iran, with 5 to 10 percent of OPEC output
to spare even during the worst months. Had this capacity been used, the
price ratchet would surely have been less severe, though it is not clear
that such action could have controlled prices altogether.
3.3 Conclusions
Whatever view one takes of the recent behavior of Saudi Arabia and
other OPEC members, some conclusions can be drawn about the future of the
world oil market. These events expose a new dimension of the market and
mark a change in the perceptions of its evolution over the next few years.
First, given the instability and loss of production in Iran, Saudi
Arabia would have had to work hard, in cooperation with other core
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members, in order to avoid the recent price increase. If all cartel core
producers had come on line at what was generally regarded to be their
installed capacity, the situation might have been manageable in the short
run. But such management would have required near-universal cooperation
on the part of producers.
Second, we need to seek more sophisticated definitions of what we
mean by "capacity" in the cartel under conditions of excess. Clearly,
excess capacity is the control device, and this capacity can be brought
on-line over long periods of time as demand grows and production plans
adjust to market conditions. Moreover, whatever one thinks of their role
in long-term price behavior, political constraints can play a strong role
in any short-term situation in which an exporter may be called upon to
increase production rapidly in order to moderate price increases. If the
core members of OPEC do not maintain excess capacity, then loss of a
major supplier would cause an uncontrolled price ratchet with no
production available to moderate the change. The fact that the capacity
is there, however, does not mean it will be used for short-term price
control.
Third, in the absence of a coordinated cartel policy to avoid price
ratchets, such events can be easily kicked off by any instability in a
major supplier or combination of minor suppliers. Were Iran to go out
of production for another two months, the same process would clearly take
place again. The price ratcheting we have just experienced could be
triggered again by any one of four or five major exporters dropping from
the market, even for short periods of time. In fact, if additional
capacity is not installed, then demand growth over time will produce a
situation in which the loss of even a small supplier will cause a ratchet
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situation. Such an event might even be "planned," e.g., if Libya were to
shut down temporarily for political reasons, or if Nigeria or Indonesia
were to try to boost the price to meet financial goals.
Fourth, it would be easy for a series of ratchets of this type to
lead to a serious overshoot. If instabilities in major suppliers are
more likely than in the past (and the on-going revolution in Iran is
enough to justify this view), then we face periodic ratcheting of this
type. It is even possible for prices to be ratcheted to a level that is
to the disadvantage of Saudi Arabia--to the extent the Saudis act as the
residual supplier--or to the disadvantage of the cartel as a whole. In
this case, prices may be expected to erode in real terms following such
an increase, or even to decline in nominal terms if the overshoot were
really large. We have not yet seen a lowering of the marker price, but
there are conditions that could lead to it. These conditions depend on
the behavior of the core countries and their willingness to absorb
cutbacks in production in the face of an overshoot of price.
Finally, events of the recent months indicate that the United States
exercises little influence over these price increases. Our supposed
power over world oil prices was based on the notion that we held some
sway over Saudi Arabian policy. Even before the events in Iran we would
have questioned this belief. In the face of the instabilities of the
last year, and the price movements that came in their wake, it seems even
less reasonable than before to assume that the United States has much
influence. Moreover, a large change in the volume of U.S. oil imports
might have an effect on prices over the longer term, but marginal
changes--say, 1 million barrels per day--would have had little or no
effect on the trajectory of prices over recent months.
24
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY
If, in fact, we do face increased instability of oil prices, then
this circumstance has implications for domestic and foreign policy in the
United States. First, there is the question of what we can do to control
prices during periods of disruption. As indicated above, there is very
little we can do to influence the behavior of major OPEC suppliers. We
may argue that larger excess capacity should be carried by countries like
Saudi Arabia, so that they will be able to exercise a moderating
influence in this kind of a circumstance. In this recent experience,
however, there is little indication that we have any influence over the
use of such excess capacity in the heat of the event. On the other hand,
in no case is it advantageous to the United States to discourage capacity
development. Even though we cannot cause the capacity to be used as a
moderating influence during market disruptions, United States policy
should be to promote oil productive capacity development worldwide,
particularly among countries that are likely to use it, i.e., those with
large populations and heavy domestic economic development expenditures.
Other actions may be undertaken to influence the way that prices
move when a disruptive event occurs. One problem in the upheaval of
recent months has been the poor quality of information about secondary
stocks. Figures on primary stocks showed a significant decline during
the months of January and February 1979, and these figures became the
basis for news stories and statements of alarm by public officials. In
fact, a good deal of this apparent "consumption" merely reflected a
shifting of supplies from primary stocks to secondary stocks. Thus, the
poor reporting system created the impression that the shortage was much
25
greater than it was in fact. Poor information led to increased
anticipations of stringency in the future and put further pressure on
spot markets.
Thus one constructive step that might be taken in the area of data
collection and reporting is the creation of a data series on secondary
stocks in the major consuming countries. The data need not be precise;
the series might be constructed by taking random samples of suppliers.
Even such a rough estimate of secondary stocks would lead to more
accurate anticipations during a period of disruption and would thus
alleviate frantic bidding in spot markets.
A second measure that might be contemplated in similar situations in
the future is the use of the strategic oil stockpile to moderate price
increases. The merit of this idea depends on which view is taken of the
intentions and likely behavior of cartel leaders such as Saudi Arabia.
If we believe that Saudi Arabia is likely to put forth a significant
effort to moderate price increases, then the use of some portion of our
stockpile to increase supplies over the short term, with the objective of
easing anticipations of stringency, could have an influence on the degree
to which spot prices rise. Such measures might influence the increases
in contract premiums that can be extracted in such a period of
disruption.
On the other hand, a stockpile strategy may be very risky if we are
wrong about the intentions of the cartel leaders. If, in fact, the
ratchet is being used to achieve a substantial increase in the world oil
price, then it is within the power of key cartel members to simply back
off and allow the United States to run down strategic stocks in a futile
attempt to contravene cartel policies. The volumes under OPEC's control
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are much larger than those of the United States stockpile. In this
situation, we would have little influence on the price premiums charged
during the period of disruption, and we would be forced to buy back our
strategic stockpile at higher prices after the ratchet was completed.4
However, in a circumstance of embargo and cutback, there may be some
advantage to the United States, in foreign policy terms, if net imports
can be reduced in the short run. For a discussion of these issues of
national security and foreign policy, see Jacoby, et al. (1979).
Naturally, in the face of a ratcheting price, it is better if the
United States imports less, strictly in terms of real resource cost.
United States reductions might also have some moderating effect on the
ratchet itself, though the nature of the process (i.e., operation in the
face of considerable excess capacity) makes the price benefits
problematic. Also, long-term supply strategies, such as a major synfuels
program, will have little effect over the ten to fifteen year horizon.
These programs should continue to be justified on the basis of the value
of the energy they produce, rather than for their role in establishing a
"backstop technology cost," which might put a cap on OPEC prices. It
does not appear that this cost information is particularly relevant to
the ratchet process. Even if it were--and synfuels were known to be
available at costs competitive with imported oil--it still would be
several decades before this energy could be produced in large volumes.
The world oil price could easily ride above any "backstop" cost, only to
4The problem is similar to that faced by central banks trying to
support currencies. If private traders know the approximate limit of the
support capability of the central bank, and if they see external forces
which are likely to overwhelm the support commitment within a reasonably
short period of time, then the whole support effort is to no avail.
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be forced down some time past the end of this century. Thus, in the face
of the ratchet, the best policies for domestic supply and demand are
those that encourage the economy to adjust as efficiently as possible to
the actual, and expected, prices of oil in world markets.
Finally, the prospect of periodic price ratchets means that the
world economic system may face a series of short-term shocks, with
accompanying problems of monetary stress and commodity inflation. Thus
far, the monetary problems caused by price ratchets have been
manageable. There is the more troublesome prospect, however, that
multiple bursts of commodity inflation might lead to contractionary
fiscal and monetary policies and restraints on trade.
We might imagine a different world, one in which shock absorbers
were built into the consumption system, or key cartel countries took on
conscious and well-understood policies to moderate the effects of the
market ratchet. These conditions do not exist today, however, and there
is no indication that such a system will be in place over the next
decade. We should prepare, therefore, for the prospect that the events
of the last year will be repeated whenever there is disruption in oil
production by a supplying country. We will very likely see several such
events over the next decade.
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